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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
In a consolidated appeal, Kenneth Randall Smith appeals from his judgment of 
conviction for possession of methamphetamine in Docket No. 40996 and from his 
judgment of conviction for aggravated assault, aggravated battery, and driving under the 
influence in Docket No. 41661. On appeal, he contends that the district court erred by 
denying his motions to suppress evidence, and abused its discretion by allowing the 
state to impeach his credibility with evidence of a prior burglary conviction. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
On August 24, 2012, at approximately 2:30 a.m., Officer Cwik pulled over Smith 
for failing to signal. (3/4/2013 Tr., p.10, L.11 - p.11, L.9.) Contacting Smith, Officer 
Cwik noticed a weapon under the driver's seat and asked Smith to step out of the car. 
(Id., p.11, L.17 - p.14, L.20.) Smith relaxed shirtless against the trunk of his car, 
removing his jacket and laying it behind him. (State's Ex. 1; 3/4/2013 Tr., p.15, L.16 -
p.16, L.12.) As the officer ran Smith's information through dispatch, he learned that 
Smith had a history of physical altercations with the police. (3/4/2013 Tr., p.17, L.10 -
p.18, L.18.) Smith's license was also expired. (Id., p.18, L.15.) Officer Cwik informed 
Smith that his license was expired, and Smith, claiming that a valid license with his 
registration was inside the car, gave the officer permission to search through the front 
seat of the car to locate them. (Id., p.20, L.4 - p.21, L.2; 4/19/2013 Tr., p.63, Ls.7-10.) 
Before searching the vehicle, Officer Cwik patted down Smith's jacket. (3/4/2013 
Tr., p.21, Ls.3-7.) Inside a pocket he located a sock containing a "hard rectangular 
object" which he recognized as "sort of a homemade, fashioned weapon." (Id., p.21, 
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Ls.17-20; p.23, Ls.5-25.) The rectangular object turned out to be a container. (Id., p.24, 
L.24 - p.25, L.2.) The container was not secure and, as Officer Cwik shook it out of the 
sock to neutralize the weapon, its contents spilled out, revealing syringes and a baggy 
with white residue. (Id., p.24, L.10 - p.26, L.B.) Smith admitted that the items belonged 
to him. (Id., p.31, Ls.4-18.) Officer Cwik seized the contraband and, after citing Smith 
for possession of paraphernalia, released him. (Id., p.32, Ls.9-12.) The white residue 
later tested positive for methamphetamine. (40996 R., pp.10-11.) 
While he was still at large on September 21, 2012, Smith, again shirtless, 
engaged in altercations at an apartment complex. Witnesses claimed that Smith first 
used his chest to shove Ms. Pichotta. (10/1/2013 Tr., p.88, L.19-p.89, L.9; p.100, L.25 
- p.101, L.17.) Then, when her sister, Ms. Ferguson, distracted his attention, he used 
his chest to shove her around. (Id., p.90, L.10 - p.91, L.6; p.102, Ls.10-18.) A 
roommate called 911 and read off Smith's license plate number. (Id., p.90, Ls.4-8.) 
Smith yelled at them not to call the police and then quickly drove away from the 
apartment complex. (Id., p.103, Ls.4-15.) The sisters reported the incident to the 
police. (Id., p.92, Ls.17-21.) 
Meanwhile, Ms. Sullivan was at home with her husband, Mr. Brumbaugh, when 
they heard a loud crash. (Id., p.108, L.22 - p.109, L.14; p.130, L.20-22.) Ms. Sullivan 
ran outside to investigate and saw Smith's car swerving down the middle of the road. 
(Id., p.110, L.8 - p.111, L.6.) She heard the vehicle stop just around the corner and, 
with her husband, decided to follow the vehicle to get its license plate number and 
report a possible DUI. (Id., p.111, Ls.10-22; p.131, Ls.16-19.) Ms. Sullivan stopped 
alongside Smith's car and Mr. Brumbaugh, sitting in the passenger seat, rolled down the 
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window to see if Smith, who was standing outside of his car, was okay. (Id., p.114, 
Ls.2-23; p.131 L.25 - p.132, L.8.) Smith responded by swinging a machete into their 
car and striking Mr. Brumbaugh's neck. (Id., p.114, L.24 - p.115, L.1; p.132, Ls.8-9.) 
Mr. Brumbaugh pushed the machete away while Ms. Sullivan drove off and reported the 
incident to the police. (Id., p.115, Ls.5-1 0; p.133, Ls.8-18.) 
Smith then began shouting at Mr. Moorhouse and approaching him aggressively. 
(Id., p.149, L.14- p.150, L.2.) Mr. Moorhouse tried to explain that he was at his house 
and he was going back inside, but Smith just became more agitated and approached 
Mr. Moorhouse more quickly. (Id., p.150, Ls.2-6.) Mr. Moorhouse retreated around the 
front of his truck. (Id., p.150, Ls.6-12.) Smith, brandishing his machete, then chased 
Mr. Moorhouse around Mr. Moorhouse's truck several times while threatening 
decapitations. (Id., p.117, Ls.7-24; p.133, L.25-p.134, L.7; p.150, L.12- p.151, L.21.) 
The chase around the vehicle finally ended when a friend of Mr. Moorhouse intervened 
and Smith left the scene. (Id., p.152, Ls.3-14.) Mr. Moorhouse then reported the 
incident to police. (Id., p.153, Ls.7-12.) 
Responding to the several reports, police were later able to locate Smith, who 
was riding a bike. (Id., p.170, Ls.5-20.) As police pursued him with their emergency 
overhead lights engaged, Smith attempted to evade them. (Id., p.170, L.21 - p.171, 
L.13.) Eventually, police were able to surround Smith. (Id., p.171, Ls.14-23.) Smith 
then aggressively approached police until an officer deployed his CED (taser) on him. 
(41661 R., pp.15-16.) Smith fell to the ground, but attempted to rip the wires off while 
continuing to disregard police commands. (Id., p.16.) After the officer activated the 
taser a second time, Smith complied. (Id.) 
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Under arrest, Smith was placed into the backseat of a patrol car. (Id., p.14.) 
Smith began chewing on the door of the patrol car. (Id.) Police then transported Smith 
to Kootenai Medical Center where, after receiving his license suspension advisory, he 
cooperated with a warrantless blood draw. (10/1/2013 Tr., p.175, L.18 - p.176, L.20; 
41661 R., pp.15, 59.) The blood examination revealed that Smith had recently used 
methamphetamine. (10/1/2013 Tr., p.183, L.7 - p.184, L.6.) 
When Smith fell to the ground after being tasered, he dropped a syringe and 
pocket knife that police recovered. (41661 R., p.14.) Police also recovered Smith's 
machete. (10/1/2013 Tr., p.69, Ls.2-13.) 
In Docket No. 40996, arising out of the incident from August 24, 2012, the state 
charged Smith with possession of methamphetamine and with being a persistent 
violator of the law. (40996 R., pp.34-35.) Smith filed a motion to suppress the evidence 
discovered during the course of the pat down of the jacket. (Id., pp.40-42.) Following a 
hearing on the motion (Id., pp.83-84; 3/4/2013 Tr.), the district court ultimately denied 
Smith's motion (40996 R., p.120). Smith entered a conditional guilty plea to the 
possession charge, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. 
(Id., pp.108-09.) 
In Docket No. 41661, arising out of the several incidents from September 21, 
2012, the state charged Smith with aggravated assault for chasing Mr. Moorehouse 
around his vehicle while brandishing the machete; aggravated battery for cutting Mr. 
Brumbaugh's neck with the machete; a misdemeanor for driving under the influence of 
methamphetamine; two batteries for pushing Ms. Pichotta and Ms. Ferguson; malicious 
injury to property for chewing on the door of the police vehicle; possession of 
4 
paraphernalia for the syringe; and resisting and obstructing arrest. ( 41661 R., pp.97-
100.) The state also filed enhancements against Smith for use of a deadly weapon and 
being a persistent violator of the law. (Id.) 
Smith filed a motion in limine to exclude testimony relating to his prior criminal 
convictions, especially his 2000 conviction for burglary out of Washington; to exclude 
testimony relating to the syringe police found on Smith; and to exclude testimony 
relating to the lab results of Smith's blood test, which revealed the presence of 
methamphetamine. (Id., pp.142-44.) At a hearing on the motion, the state expressed 
that it had no intention to bring in the prior convictions, except for the burglary for the 
purpose of impeachment. (Id., pp.157-59; 5/13/2013 Tr., p.20, L.16 - p.23, L.8.) The 
district court denied the motion in regards to the prior burglary conviction. (41661 R., 
p.167; 5/13/2013 Tr., p.26, L.20-p.27, L.10.) Recognizing that parts Ill and IV of the 
motion were really motions to dismiss charges, the district court denied those portions 
without prejudice. (41661 R., p.167; 5/13/2013 Tr., p.27, L.11-p.28, L.8.) 
Smith then filed a motion to suppress the evidence from the blood draw. (41661 
R., pp.160-63.) The district court held a hearing on the motion (Id., pp.183-84; 
5/31/2013 Tr.), and ultimately denied it (41661 R., pp.185, 197). 
Smith pleaded guilty to the misdemeanors of injury to property, possession of 
paraphernalia, and resisting and obstructing an officer (Id., p.231; 9/20/2013 Tr. p.54, 
L.2 - p.55, L.6; p.56, L.22 - p.57, L.5), and went to trial on the remaining counts (41661 
R., pp.247-72). The jury found Smith guilty of aggravated battery, aggravated assault, 
and driving under the influence, but acquitted him of the other two batteries. (41661 R., 
pp.317-18.) 
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In accordance with Smith's guilty plea in Docket No. 40996, the district court 
entered judgment against Smith for possession of methamphetamine and sentenced 
him to a term of five years fixed. (40996 R., pp.131-35.) Pursuant to the jury's finding 
of guilt in Docket No. 41661, the district court entered judgment against Smith and 
sentenced him to unified terms of 23 years with eight years fixed each on the 
aggravated assault and on the aggravated battery. (41661 R., pp.331-35.) The district 
court ordered that Smith serve all sentences concurrently. (40996 R., p.132; 41661 R., 
p.332.) 
Smith filed timely notices of appeal. (40996 R., pp.111-13; 41661 R., pp.345-48.) 
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ISSUES 
Smith states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Smith's motion to 
suppress in the possession case? 
2. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Smith's motion to 
suppress in the aggravated assault case? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Smith's 
motion in limine in the aggravated assault case and permitted the State to 
impeach his credibility with his prior conviction for burglary? 
(Appellant's brief, p.12.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Smith failed to show error in the denial of his motion to suppress evidence of 
methamphetamine discovered in the course of a Terry1 frisk? 
2. Has Smith failed to show error in the denial of his motion to suppress the 
evidence acquired through the warrantless blood draw? 
3. Has Smith failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by allowing 
the state to impeach Smith's credibility with his prior conviction for burglary? 




Smith Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred By Denying His Motion To 
Suppress Evidence Discovered In The Course Of A Terry Frisk 
A. Introduction 
On appeal, Smith challenges the district court's denial of his suppression motion, 
arguing that the traffic stop was unlawfully extended, that the Terry frisk of Smith's 
jacket was unlawful, and that Smith's Miranda 2 rights were violated when officers asked 
him if he owned the items in the container found during the Terry frisk. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.13-26.) None of these arguments have merit. Application of the correct legal 
standards to the relevant facts found by the district court shows no error in the denial of 
Smith's suppression motion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence and exercises 
free review of the trial court's determination as to whether constitutional standards have 
been satisfied in light of the facts found. State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 485-86, 
211 P.3d 91, 94-95 (2009). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the 
credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual 
inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 
P.2d 993, 997 (1995). 
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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C. Officers Did Not Violate Smith's Fourth Amendment Rights 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that "[t]he right 
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
The right of persons to be free from government intrusions "must be shaped by the 
context in which it is asserted. For 'what the Constitution forbids is not all searches and 
seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures."' Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 
(1960) (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960)). "When an officer is 
justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at 
close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others, it would 
appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take necessary 
measures to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon and to 
neutralize the threat of physical harm." Terry, 392 U.S. at 24. "The purpose of this 
limited search is not to discover evidence of a crime, but to allow the Officer to pursue 
his investigation without fear of violence." Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 
(1972). In determining the validity of a Terry search, the question for reviewing courts is 
an objective one: "Would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure 
or search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was 
appropriate?" Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22 (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 
(1925); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96-97 (1964)). 
While routine traffic stops by police officers implicate the Fourth Amendment's 
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, the reasonableness of a traffic 
stop is also analyzed under Terry, because a traffic stop is more similar to an 
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investigative detention than a custodial arrest. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 
(1979); State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003). "An 
investigative detention is permissible if it is based upon specific articulable facts which 
justify suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is about to be engaged in 
criminal activity." Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 983, 88 P.3d at 1223 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 
21; United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,417 (1981)). 
An investigative detention must not only be justified at its beginning, but must 
also be conducted in a manner that is reasonably related in scope and duration to the 
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. Florida v. Royer, 460 
U.S. 491, 499-500 (1983); State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 181, 90 P.3d 926, 931 (Ct. App. 
2004). "The purpose of a stop is not permanently fixed, however, at the moment the 
stop is initiated, for during the course of the detention there may evolve suspicion of 
criminality different from that which initially prompted the stop." Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 
984, 88 P.3d at 1224. Routine traffic stops may turn up suspicious circumstances which 
could justify an officer asking questions unrelated to the stop. State v. Myers, 118 Idaho 
608, 613, 798 P .2d 453, 458 (Ct. App. 1990). "The officer's observations, general 
inquiries, and events succeeding the stop may-and often do-give rise to legitimate 
reasons for particular lines of inquiry and further investigation by an officer." ~ 
Application of the foregoing standards to the facts found by the district court 
shows no violation of Smith's Fourth Amendment rights. 
1. Smith's Detention Was Not Unlawfully Extended 
As he did below, Smith asserts on appeal that his detention was unlawfully 
extended. (Appellant's brief, pp.15-22.) It was not. 
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In relation to this issue, the district court explained that "the facts become 
particularly clear upon reviewing the video [State's Ex. 1]" that there was no unlawful 
extension of the detention. (4/19/2013 Tr., p.62, L.23 - p.63, L.21.) Upon contact, 
Officer Cwik requested Smith's license and proof of insurance. (Id., p.63, Ls.3-5.) The 
license Smith produced was expired. (Id., p.63, Ls.5-7.) Smith claimed that he had 
valid documents in the car and gave the officer permission to search the vehicle for 
those documents. (Id., p.63, Ls.7-10.) 
An officer may lawfully request a driver's license and proof of insurance. State v. 
George, 127 Idaho 693, 699, 905 P.2d 626, 632 (1995). Officers need to correctly 
identify suspects and "determin[e] the validity and status of the driver's license upon 
which that identification is based." State v. Godwin, 121 Idaho 517, 520, 826 P.2d 478, 
481 (Ct. App. 1991 ). Therefore, Officer Cwik did not, indeed could not, extend the 
detention's duration by merely requesting and receiving consent to locate Smith's 
license, registration, and proof of insurance. 
2. Officer Cwik's Terry Frisk Of Smith's Jacket Was Reasonable 
Smith also asserts, as he did below, that the Terry frisk of his jacket was 
unlawful. (Appellant's brief, pp.17-22.) Terry frisks are justified when the officer has 
reason to believe that the individual he is investigating is "armed and presently 
dangerous to the officer or to others." State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 818, 203 P.3d 
1203, 1217 (2009) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 24). "The test is an objective one that asks 
whether, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonably prudent person would be 
justified in concluding that the individual posed a risk of danger." kl (citing State v. 
Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 660-61, 152 P.3d 16, 21-22 (2007)). 
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The district court found the following relevant facts: The stop occurred late at 
night. (4/19/2013 Tr., p.65, L.23.) During the course of the stop, Officer Cwik saw 
weapons inside Smith's vehicle. (Id., p.63, L.24 - p.64, L.1.) Dispatch also advised that 
Smith had previously been charged with assault on an officer. (Id., p.64, Ls.1-5; see 
also 3/4/2013 Tr., p.18, Ls.15-18.) The jacket was "well within [Smith's] reach." 
(4/19/2013 Tr., p.64, Ls.7-9.) And when Officer Cwik went to examine the jacket, Smith 
became agitated and lunged at the officer. (Id., p.64, Ls.18-22; p.66, Ls.3-6.) Based on 
the totality of these circumstances, the district court found that Officer Cwik's frisk of 
Smith's jacket was reasonable because Smith posed a risk of danger. 
Smith also asserts on appeal that, even if Officer Cwik was justified in performing 
a Terry frisk, the officer exceeded the scope of that frisk when he removed the canister 
from the sock. (Appellant's brief, pp.20-22.) Smith's argument fails. The justification 
for a Terry search is the protection of police officers in the performance of their duties. 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. While patting down Smith's jacket, Officer Cwik discovered a 
sock containing a hard rectangular object. (3/4/2013 Tr., p.21, Ls.17-23; p.23, Ls.5-18.) 
As Officer Cwik testified, and Idaho caselaw confirms, a sock containing a solid object 
can be used as a deadly weapon. (Id., p.10, Ls.8-10; p.23, Ls.15-25; see also State v. 
Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 364, 670 P.2d 463, 465 (1983).) Once a weapon has been 
discovered, it would be "unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take necessary 
measures to ... neutralize the threat of physical harm." Terry, 392 U.S. at 24. 
Smith contends that, once "the sock was in the officer's possession, it was not 
necessary to further examine it or remove its contents to discover weapons which might 
have been used to harm the officer." (Appellant's brief, p.20.) But this entirely misses 
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the point. Neither the sock nor the solid canister, alone, is a weapon. It is the solid 
object inside of the sock that can be used as a weapon to deadly effect. See, ~. 
Creech, supra. By separating the canister from the sock, Officer Cwik neutralized the 
threatening weapon-which is the purpose of a Terry frisk. 
Smith's attempts to analogize his case to State v. Faith, 141 Idaho 728, 117 P.3d 
142 (Ct. App. 2005), are equally unavailing. In Faith, officers found an Altoids tin on the 
suspect which, after seizing, they then opened to ensure that it did not contain 
weapons. Faith, 141 Idaho at 730, 117 P.3d at 144. But, as the Court explained, an 
Altoids tin is just a container, not a weapon. kl The officers, therefore, were not 
permitted to seize the tin, let alone search it. kl Unlike an Altoids tin, the sock-with-
solid-object combo can be used as a weapon, and it was reasonable for the officer to 
neutralize that weapon by disassembling it. Had the officer opened the canister to 
search its contents after neutralizing the threat, then this case would be like Faith. But 
that is not what happened. The canister was not secured and simply fell open when 
removed from the sock, exposing its contents to the officer's plain view. (3/4/2013 Tr., 
p.24, L.15 - p.25, L.23.) The Court's holding in Faith does not apply. 
Because Smith posed a threat, Officer Cwik's Terry frisk was reasonable. When 
that frisk revealed a weapon, neutralizing the threat by seizing and disassembling the 
weapon was also reasonable. The district court correctly denied Smith's suppression 
motion because Smith's rights were not violated. The district court should be affirmed. 
D. Officers Did Not Violate Smith's Miranda Rights 
As he did below, Smith asserts on appeal that his Miranda rights were violated by 
the police when he admitted that the syringes and baggie that fell out of the canister 
13 
belonged to him. (Appellant's brief, pp.22-26.) Smith's rights were not violated because 
Smith was never in custody such that Miranda would apply. 
To safeguard the privilege against self-incrimination afforded by the Fifth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution, the United States Supreme Court held in 
Miranda v. Arizona that before an individual is subjected to custodial interrogation, the 
interrogating officers must advise the individual of certain rights, including the right to 
remain silent. ~. 384 U.S. at 478-79. Miranda rights may not be invoked, however, 
unless a defendant is in custody equivalent to formal arrest. State v. Hurst, 151 Idaho 
430, 436, 258 P.3d 950, 956 (Ct. App. 2011 ). The defendant bears the burden of 
establishing that he was in custody for purposes of Miranda. State v. James, 148 Idaho 
574,577,225 P.3d 1169, 1172 (2010). 
The test for determining whether an individual is in custody for purposes of 
Miranda is whether, objectively considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding 
an interrogation, there was a "formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the 
degree associated with a formal arrest." California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 
(1983) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)). Relevant factors in 
making this determination include the time, location, public visibility of the interrogation, 
the conduct of the officers, the nature and manner of the questioning, the extent to 
which officers confront the suspect with evidence of his guilt, and the presence of other 
persons. State v. Albaugh, 133 Idaho 587, 591, 990 P.2d 753, 757 (Ct. App. 1999); 
State v. Medrano, 123 Idaho 114,117,844 P.2d 1364, 1367 (Ct. App. 1992). Because 
the "in custody" test for Miranda requires a restraint on freedom associated with formal 
arrest, "the temporary and relatively nonthreatening detention involved in a traffic stop 
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... does not constitute Miranda custody." Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 113 (201 O) 
(citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 (1984)). 
The district court, objectively examining the totality of the circumstances, found 
that Smith was not in custody and, therefore, the dictates of Miranda did not apply. 
(4/19/2013 Tr., p.68, Ls.4-8.) Specifically, the district court found that (1) Smith was not 
arrested; (2) he was not handcuffed; (3) he was not placed in the police car; (4) the 
questioning took place in an open space between the police car and Smith's car; (5) 
there were only two policemen present and only one of those questioned Smith; (6) the 
questioning only took a few minutes; and (7) Smith was released following the 
questioning. (Id., p.67, L.18 - p.68, L.3.) These findings are supported by the record 
(see State's Ex. 1 ), and are undisputed on appeal. Based on the totality of these 
circumstances, the district court correctly determined that Smith was not in custody and 
properly denied his suppression motion. 
On appeal, Smith asserts that he was in custody because, with police present, he 
might not feel free to go. (Appellant's brief, pp.23-26.) But that does not show custody. 
As quoted above, "the temporary and relatively nonthreatening detention involved in a 
traffic stop ... does not constitute Miranda custody." Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 113. Smith 
failed to meet his burden of showing that he was in custody equivalent to formal arrest 
such that the dictates of Miranda would apply to his detention. The district court 
correctly denied his suppression motion and should be affirmed.3 
3 It is also worth noting that, even if officers were required to give Miranda warnings in 
this case, the failure to do so would constitute harmless error because questioning 
Smith was not necessary to establish his ownership over the contraband. As can be 
seen in the video recording of the incident, Smith repeatedly and strenuously asserted 
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11. 
Smith Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motion To Suppress The 
Evidence Acquired Through The Warrantless Blood Draw 
A. Introduction 
Below, Smith was subject to a warrantless blood draw under Idaho Code § 18-
8002. (41661 R., pp.28, 42.) Smith later filed a motion to suppress the evidence 
acquired through that blood draw. (Id., pp.160-63.) Applying the legal precedents in 
effect at the time, the district court held that Smith impliedly consented to the blood draw 
and that implied consent is irrevocable and denied the motion. (5/31/2013 Tr., p.46, 
L.16 - p.47, L.20.) 
During the pendency of this appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court adopted a new 
implied consent standard for warrantless blood draws in State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 
337 P.3d 575 (2014). Applying this new legal standard to the facts before the district 
court still shows no error in the district court's denial of Smith's suppression motion. 
The district court's order should therefore be affirmed. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence and exercises 
free review of the trial court's determination as to whether constitutional standards have 
been satisfied in light of the facts found. State v. Willoughby. 147 Idaho 482, 485-86, 
211 P.3d 91, 94-95 (2009). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the 
credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual 
his ownership over the container, which he claimed held his "sacred" "gay porn," before 
officers ever questioned him regarding the container or its contents. (State's Ex. 1.) 
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inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 
P.2d 993, 997 (1995). 
C. Because The Record Is Devoid Of Evidence That Smith Revoked His Implied 
Consent, That Consent Was Valid 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that "[t]he right 
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
Requiring that a person submit to a blood alcohol test is a search and seizure under the 
Fourth Amendment. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966). "[S]earches 
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, 
are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few 
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347, 357 (1967). One exception to the warrant requirement is a search done 
pursuant to consent. Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (citations 
omitted). The voluntariness of an individual's consent is a question of fact to be 
determined based upon the totality of the circumstances. kl at 227. 
Consent may be implied under Idaho's implied consent statute. State v. Diaz, 
144 Idaho 300, 302-03, 160 P.3d 739, 741-42 (2007). As recently held by the Idaho 
Supreme Court, for implied consent under Idaho Code § 18-8002 to be voluntary, (1) 
drivers must give their initial consent voluntarily and (2) drivers must continue to give 
voluntary consent. Wulff, 157 Idaho at _, 337 P.3d at 582. "Drivers in Idaho give 
their initial consent to evidentiary testing by driving on Idaho roads voluntarily." kl 
(citing Diaz, 144 Idaho at 303, 160 P.3d at 742). That Smith voluntarily drove on Idaho 
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roads is uncontested. Therefore, his initial implied consent for evidentiary testing was 
voluntary and valid. 
The question remains whether Smith's consent continued to be valid. The district 
court, applying the legal standards in existence at the time, noted that Smith could not 
"withdraw the consent that was implied under the statute." (5/31/2013 Tr., p.47, Ls.8-11 
(citing State v. Wheeler, 149 Idaho 364, 233 P.3d 1286 (Ct. App. 2010).) That is no 
longer good law. The Idaho Supreme Court now recognizes that a driver may revoke or 
withdraw his implied consent. State v. Halseth, Docket No. 41169, 2014 Opinion No. 
127, pp.5-6 (Idaho, December 2, 2014). But to do so, the driver must at least object to 
the blood draw. kl 
Below, Smith argued that he did not affirmatively consent to the blood draw. 
(5/31/2013 Tr., p.40, Ls.5-14.) But he was not required to affirmatively consent to the 
blood draw. By driving on Idaho roads, Smith impliedly consented to the blood draw. 
Wulff, 157 Idaho at_, 337 P.3d at 582. While implied consent is revocable, until it is 
unambiguously revoked, it is valid. Asserting that Smith did not affirmatively consent to 
the blood draw is a markedly different contention than asserting that he subsequently 
revoked or withdrew his implied consent. 
There is no evidence that suggests, let alone demonstrates, that Smith revoked 
or withdrew his implied consent. At no time below did Smith assert that he revoked his 
implied consent. (See 41661 R., pp.160-63, 177-82; 5/31/2013 Tr., p.40, L.20 - p.43, 
L.7; p.44, L.5 - p.45, L.2.) There is no evidence that he objected to the blood draw. 
(See 41661 R., pp.27-28, 43-45.) The record shows that when given the suspension 
advisory, Smith did not refuse evidentiary testing. (Id., p.42.) In fact, the only testimony 
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presented about the blood draw was that Smith "cooperated." (10/1/2013 Tr., p.176, 
Ls.6-20.) 
The analysis begins with Smith's valid implied consent. Unless and until Smith 
revokes that consent, it stands. Smith submitted to the blood draw; he did not refuse it. 
Not only is there no evidence, there is no argument that Smith unambiguously revoked 
his implied consent at any time below. Applying the new standard articulated by the 
Idaho Supreme Court in Wulff, the blood draw was valid. The district court therefore did 
not err by denying Smith's suppression motion and its order should be affirmed. 
D. Harmless Error 
Even if the record demonstrated sufficient evidence that Smith had in fact 
withdrawn his implied consent, admission of evidence from the blood draw would still 
constitute harmless error in regards to Smith's felony convictions. "[T]he Constitution 
entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one." Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 
475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986). The standard for determining whether error is harmless is 
whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the jury's verdict 
"and that the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt." State v. Jones, 125 Idaho 477,488, 873 P.2d 122, 133 (1994). "An 
error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if the Court can conclude, based upon the 
evidence and argument presented during the trial, that the jury would have reached the 
same result absent the error." State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 471, 163 P.3d 
1175, 1183 (2007) (citation omitted). 
The evidence that Smith cut Mr. Brumbaugh's neck with his machete and chased 
Mr. Moorhouse around his truck while brandishing that machete was overwhelming. 
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The admission of evidence from the warrantless blood draw showing that Smith had 
recently used methamphetamine would have had no effect on either of Smith's felony 
convictions. This Court can therefore conclude that any error in admitting the evidence 
is harmless in regards to those convictions.4 
111. 
Smith Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Allowing 
The State To Admit Evidence Of Smith's Prior Burglary Conviction To Impeach Him 
A. Introduction 
Smith argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion in 
limine and allowing the state to impeach Smith with evidence of his prior conviction for 
burglary. (Appellant's brief, pp.34-41.) Application of the correct legal standards to the 
facts of this case shows no abuse of the court's discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and its 
judgment will be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion. State 
v. Perry. 139 Idaho 520, 521, 81 P.3d 1230, 1231 (2003). Relevance of a prior 
conviction is a question of law reviewed de nova while the prejudicial impact of such 
evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Thompson, 132 Idaho 628, 
630, 977 P.2d 890, 892 (1999) (citing State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 766, 864 
P.2d 596, 604 (1993)). 
4 This argument does not apply to Smith's misdemeanor DUI conviction. The state 
recognizes that evidence that Smith had used methamphetamine while driving would be 
directly relevant to his DUI conviction. If admission of that evidence was erroneous, the 
state concedes that the DUI conviction, alone, would need to be vacated and the case 
remanded for further proceedings on that charge. 
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C. The District Court Properly Allowed The State To Admit Evidence Of Smith's 
Prior Conviction For Burglary Under Idaho Rule Of Evidence 609 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 609(a) governs the admissibility of evidence of a prior 
felony conviction and provides, in relevant part: 
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence of the 
fact that the witness has been convicted of a felony and the nature of the 
felony shall be admitted if elicited from the witness or established by public 
record, but only if the court determines in a hearing outside the presence 
of the jury that the fact of the prior conviction or the nature of the prior 
conviction, or both, are relevant to the credibility of the witness and that 
the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial 
effect to the party offering the witness. 
The Idaho Supreme Court, addressing this rule, has explained 
that "different felonies have different degrees of probative value on the 
issue of credibility. Some, such as perjury, are intimately connected with 
that issue; others, such as robbery and burglary, are somewhat less 
relevant; and [a]cts of violence ... generally have little or no direct bearing 
on honesty and veracity." 
State v. Ybarra, 102 Idaho 573, 580-581, 634 P.2d 435, 442-443 (1981) (quoting 
California v. Rollo, 569 P.2d 771, 775 (Cal. 1977)) (alteration added, ellipses original). 
The Court has further stated that "[t]he determination whether evidence of a particular 
felony conviction is relevant to credibility depends on the particular facts and 
circumstances of each case and must therefore be decided on a case-by-case basis." 
Statev. Bush, 131 ldaho22, 31,951 P.2d 1249, 1258 (1997). 
Below, Smith argued that evidence of his prior conviction for burglary was "stale" 
because it dated back to 2000, and otherwise had limited probative value. (5/13/2013 
Tr., p.17, L.24 - p.19, L.23; p.26, Ls.2-11.) Reviewing Rule 609, the district court 
recognized that, because Smith was not released from prison until 2005 on the 
conviction, the conviction was within the ten year rule. (Id., p.26, L.20 - p.27, L.1; see 
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also I.R.E. 609(b) ("Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period 
of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of 
the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later 
date .... ").) Applying relevant legal standards, the district court also found, consistent 
with Ybarra, that Smith's burglary conviction weighed on credibility. (5/13/2013 Tr., 
p.27, Ls.2-4.) Recognizing its discretion to admit such evidence, the district court 
properly exercised that discretion and denied Smith's motion in limine, allowing the state 
to use the conviction for impeachment at trial. (Id., p.27, Ls.5-10.) 
On appeal, Smith claims that the district court erred because if "did not weigh the 
probative value of the evidence of the prior conviction against its unfair prejudicial 
effect." (Appellant's brief, pp.36-38.) Smith's argument fails. Smith did not identify any 
unfair prejudice, below or on appeal. Where the defendant fails to identify any unfair 
prejudice, the district court does not commit error by not conducting the Rule 403 
balancing test on the record. State v. Fordyce, 151 Idaho 868, 871, 264 P.3d 975, 978 
(Ct. App. 2011 ). 
"Evidence is not unfairly prejudicial simply because it is damaging to a 
defendant's case. Evidence is unfairly prejudicial when it suggests decision on an 
improper basis." ~ at 870, 264 P.3d at 977 (citations omitted). While defense counsel 
asserted that presenting evidence of Smith's prior burglary would have "extreme 
prejudice" (5/13/2013 Tr., p.26, Ls.9-11 ), counsel never supported this naked assertion, 
let alone identified any unfair prejudice. Nor does Smith identify any unfair prejudice on 
appeal. (See Appellant's brief, pp.36-41.) Because Smith failed to identify any unfair 
prejudice to weigh against the probative value of his burglary conviction, the district 
22 
court was not required to conduct a weighing of the probative value of the prior 
conviction against its (nonexistent) unfair prejudice on the record. And even if it was 
error to not conduct the weighing on the record, such error is necessarily harmless, 
again, because Smith has never identified unfair prejudice that would weigh against the 
evidence's probative value. Smith has failed to show any error by the district court in 
denying his motion in limine; the district court should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's orders 
denying Smith's motion to suppress evidence in Docket No. 40996 and denying Smith's 
motion to suppress evidence and motion in limine in Docket No. 41661. 
DATED this 14th day of January, 2015. 
~~~-PE-N-'-C_E_R ___ _ 
Deputy Attorney General 
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